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I. Introduction
Nationwide, the Great Recession is technically over.  Real gross domestic product (GDP) 
is expanding, modest job growth has begun, and housing prices are stabilizing.  A halting 
and tentative economic recovery is underway.
And yet, all is not well, and especially not in California and the Mountain states.  Three 
years after the collapse of a massive housing “bubble,” the deepest economic downturn 
in memory has exposed and exacerbated a massive public-sector fiscal crisis that is af-
fecting all of the region’s states, albeit in varied ways.
To be sure, the crisis in public budgets is not the only problem Western states face:  In 
Arizona, California, Colorado, and Nevada employment levels remain fully 2 million jobs 
off their pre-recession peak.1  But it is now the state budget crisis that promises to bring 
the most painful next round of dislocations to the fore. 
The cyclical and structural 
budget deficits racking 
California and the Mountain 
states challenge leaders to 
break with past budgeting 
habits and embrace balance 
as their watchword.
Structurally Unbalanced:   
Cyclical and Structural Deficits  
in California and the Intermountain West
By Matthew Murray with Sue Clark-Johnson, Mark Muro, and Jennifer Vey
Though the Great Recession may be officially over, economic recovery is slow and 
tentative, particularly in California and much of the Intermountain West.  Among 
other challenges, the protracted downturn in these states has exposed and aggra-
vated a huge public-sector  fiscal crisis—with disconcerting implications for citizens 
and states’ long-term economic health.
This brief takes a careful look at the fiscal situation in Arizona, California, Colorado, 
and Nevada, examining both their serious cyclical budget shortfalls—those resulting 
from the recession and its aftermath—as well as the critical longer-term structural 
imbalances between revenues and expenditures that have developed in Arizona, Cali-
fornia, and, to a lesser extent, Nevada.  Along these lines, the study uses a unique 
methodology to estimate the size of the states’ structural deficits (or, in Colorado, the 
surplus) and explores the mix of forces, particularly the policy choices, that created 
them.  After that, the authors highlight the dramatic impacts these states’ fiscal chal-
lenges, and government responses to them, are having on service delivery as well as 
local governments.  The brief suggests some of the steps state policymakers must take 
to close their budget gaps over the short and longer term.
First, it urges better policymaking and prods leaders to broaden, balance, and di-
versify their revenue bases while looking to ensure a long-haul balance of taxing 
and spending.  And second, the report recommends that the states improve the 
information sharing and budgeting processes through which fiscal problems are 
understood—so they may be averted.
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A moment of reckoning has arrived, after all.  During much of the 1990s and again in the 
mid-2000s, California and the Mountain states had enjoyed years of strong economic 
growth that had produced what appeared to be robust budgets.  This created a fiscal 
mirage that allowed several of these states to expand public service provision as well as 
implement permanent tax cuts—with seemingly little thought as to how they might be 
sustained over the longer term.  But now the illusion has been shattered, as the length and 
depth of the economic downturn has at once created serious temporary or cyclical bud-
get shortfalls in these states (associated with the business cycle) while also exposing the 
existence of long-term structural deficits that have resulted in large part from starry-eyed 
decisionmaking during better times.2 Such policy choices have now interacted with the 
base performance of the states’ fiscal systems (i.e. the structure of taxes and expenditures) 
and broader economic and demographic trends to produce in some cases massive chronic 
imbalances that have largely been overlooked in discussions of states’ current fiscal health. 
Hence this primer:  Intended to help motivate and inform urgent work to close Western 
states’ fiscal gaps and avoid their reemergence, the present brief explores the nature and 
scope of the cyclical and structural deficits now confronting Arizona, California, Colorado, 
and Nevada and suggests some prudent ways policymakers should respond.
Already these states have struggled to close (or nearly close) total budgetary gaps for Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2011 that were nothing less than monumental.3  These gaps included: in Arizona, 
$3.1 billion or 36.6 percent of the final budget; in California,  $17.9 billion or 21.6 percent 
of the final budget; in Colorado, $1.5 billion or 21.6 percent of the final budget; and in Ne-
vada, $1.8 billion or an astonishing 54.0 percent of the final budget.  In closing these holes, 
California has garnered the most attention for its use of a mix of deep spending cuts and a 
host of one-time maneuvers that balance budgets today but leave unattended the reality 
of future budget shortfalls.4 And yet other Western states have themselves deeply slashed 
aid to public education, state university systems, and social welfare programs while employ-
ing their own short-term devices and gimmicks. These include temporary tax increases like 
the voter-approved sales tax rate hike in Arizona, the sweeping use of idle fund balances 
across most states, and highly publicized asset sales in Arizona and California.
What is more, now that many of those quick fixes have been exhausted, a starker reality 
has set in in which deeper-going structural deficits will place continued extreme pressure 
on annual budgets even as economic health returns—albeit slowly—to the states.  
The forecast is bleak: With budgets already slashed but overhangs of hundreds of millions 
of dollars looming, state governments in the West are now going to be compelled to 
implement huge new cuts to budgets for education, innovation, economic development, 
health care, and services for the vulnerable, the old, and the young, all the while foisting 
greater burdens on local governments whose own budgets are in dire straits.  
In short, at a time when state governments need to invest and innovate to create jobs, 
educate workers, and build the next economy in Western metropolitan areas, they will 
be grappling with historic, long-developing budget crises that threaten to significantly 
weaken their ability to act—unless they innovate in resolving them.5
This brief attempts to distill these issues.  It first examines the nature of cyclical and struc-
tural deficits and the forces that create them.  It then provides structural deficit estimates 
for Arizona, California, Colorado and Nevada, discusses the factors that have contributed to 
their emergence, and highlights the implications these deficits—and the states’ response 
to them—have for their residents and economies.  The final major section of the brief 
points to some recommendations for policymakers, suggesting not so much a full blue-
print for erasing the present deficits as a guide for putting in place the right platform for 
attacking these gargantuan problems.  This guide includes two key ideas: First, states need 
to improve the quality of their fiscal policymaking by steadily working to broaden, balance, and 
diversify their revenue bases while looking to the long-haul balance of taxing and spend-
ing. And second, states need to concurrently improve the information sharing and budgeting 
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processes through which fiscal problems are identified, analyzed, and addressed. Each of 
these changes will require of leaders substantial self-discipline.
In sum, the choices that need to be made by California and the Mountain states are difficult 
and they will be unpopular in many circles.  Hopefully this short primer will help four 
states emblematic of hope and ingenuity better understand and ultimately work through 
their colossal challenges successfully.
II.  Framing the Issue: The Nature of State Structural Deficits
How can sizable structural deficits or even unmanageably large cyclical deficits exist 
when states generally are required to maintain budget balance?  There are two basic 
ways.  Cyclical deficits can spike in economic downturns when reduced economic activity 
diminishes revenue performance and lower incomes and higher unemployment rates 
put added pressures on spending.  At the same time, a weak economy can also help expose 
longer-term structural (or chronic) imbalances between revenues and expenditures.  In 
this circumstance revenue consistently fails to grow in tandem with expenditure obliga-
tions and the cost of government.  At any point in time a state’s total deficit (surplus) is the 
sum of its cyclical and structural deficits (surpluses).  
While there is growing attention to the problem, most states, analysts, and policymak-
ers fail to distinguish between cyclical and structural deficits.  For example, the budget 
gap figures presented above for California and the Mountain states include cyclical 
imbalances as well as any underlying structural imbalances between revenues and ex-
penditures.  In fact, only a small number of analysts have developed structural deficit 
estimates for individual states.6  The absence of good, timely data contribute to a lack of 
understanding of the scope and breadth of the deficit problems confronting states, and 
ultimately to the failure of their leaders to take the tough policy actions needed to address 
structural problems, even as they scrap and scrape to close year-to-year budget gaps.  
Hal Hovey is one of the first policy analysts to formalize and estimate the size of structural 
deficits for all America states.7  Hovey defined a structural deficit as “…a condition in 
which the revenues produced by a state’s tax system (along with its other revenues) 
are insufficient to maintain existing levels of services.”  He notes that “structural deficits 
arise when government spending and revenues are inconsistent over long time horizons.” 
This inconsistency reflects a permanent imbalance between revenues and expenditures 
and may come from any of a number of sources that broadly can be placed in three 
categories: the prevailing fiscal structure, economic and demographic trends, and political 
decisionmaking.  These three factors interact to influence both near-term and long-term 
fiscal health.  Consider each in turn:
▪  Fiscal structure.  A state’s existing fiscal structure defines expenditure obligations and the 
means of financing them through the tax system, and will influence the degree of growth in 
revenues and expenditures over time.  This fiscal structure will have its roots in both statute 
and a state’s constitution.  Some expenditures may be discretionary while others may be 
mandated by previous choices made by voters and politicians.  For example, state constitutions 
typically require a level of elementary and secondary education spending that is enshrined in 
the state’s legislated schools funding formula.   The revenue system structure used to pay for 
these and other expenditures includes a mix of taxes (e.g. income, sales, property) and fees 
and their rates and bases, which also vary from state to state.  Nevada, for example, is one of 
only a handful of states nationwide with no personal income tax.  Overall fiscal performance is 
therefore heavily influenced by a state’s overall revenue fiscal arrangements, which affect the 
amount of money coming in and going out of state coffers. 
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▪  The economy and demographics.  Trends affecting a state’s economy and demographic 
composition can impact how a given fiscal structure stands up across budget cycles.  All 
states with a sales tax, for example, have seen revenue performance weaken as the overall 
economy has become more service-oriented, since the traditional sales tax falls primarily 
on tangible goods.  Population shifts, too, can impact a state’s fiscal health.  The effects of 
strong population growth, for example, depend on the extent to which new residents pay 
for themselves:  A large increase of lower-income residents places more fiscal on pressure 
on both sides of budgets than does a swelling middle- or upper-income populace.  An aging 
population, moreover, can contribute it own pressures by driving up spending on health 
and human services and public employee benefit programs.  In these ways, then, a state 
largely without structural deficits today may see them emerge in the future as economic 
and demographic trends ripple through the budget, even with no changes in policy.
▪  Political decisionmaking.  Political decisions can play a huge role in budget dynam-
ics, as changes made to a state’s fiscal structure in one budget cycle can and often do 
have significant effects on its long-term fiscal health.  During periods of strong economic 
growth, for example, states often enjoy cyclical budget surpluses.  Decisionmakers often 
fail to consider that these surges in revenue are temporary, however.  For that reason, 
state budget surpluses are rarely saved in their entirety, with only a fraction typically 
committed to rainy day funds.  More often, the larger portion of such surpluses is given 
back to taxpayers through permanent tax cuts or used to support permanent spending 
increases.  As a result, a fiscal shortfall typically emerges during a downturn that includes 
both the cyclical deficit along with any structural deficit arising from the long-term tax/
expenditure mismatch created during previous periods of economic expansion.   In this 
way, policy decisions made by state legislatures or directly by the voting public, as well as 
by federal mandate, can contribute substantially to the emergence of permanent, recur-
rent budget imbalances.  For example, voter initiatives may be introduced that mandate 
higher spending or that place restrictions on the effective capacity of states to raise rev-
enues—initiatives that, as noted above, can become fiscally unsustainable as the econo-
my progresses through the classic boom and bust cycle.  What is more, when economic 
times get rough, policymakers often neglect to make the tough decisions needed to put 
state budgets back on track, commonly resorting to one-time fixes that resolve the cur-
rent deficit but do little or nothing to resolve more deeply seated structural imbalances 
between revenues and expenditures.  While one-time remedies like base-funding reduc-
tions might be necessary as well as politically expedient, they can have ongoing effects 
even after economic health is restored. 
In any event, these three forces each have an independent influence on the budget and 
also can interact in such a way as to produce or magnify a fiscal crisis.  A classic conver-
gence of crisis-spawning events is a growth cycle that produces rising income tax rev-
enues that in turn lead to tax cuts; healthy revenues that convince the public to mandate 
spending increases; and a growing population that needs to be served by program ex-
pansion.  The convergence then brings disaster when the economy falls into a recession, 
exposing the well-intentioned but ultimately faulty decisionmaking that took place dur-
ing times of better economic and fiscal health.  
Though often overlooked, the imbalances created by structural deficits are hugely impor-
tant because they further complicate the resolution of cyclical fiscal problems. Together, 
they can produce devastating consequences for state economies and their residents. 
Critical services ranging from public safety to education may be subjected to larger cuts. 
Infrastructure spending may suffer from greater reductions and deferral. And tax rates 
may need to be raised further than would be the case if the state were only addressing 
a cyclical shortfall. Moreover, there comes a point when spending cuts begin to hit resi-
dents, and ultimately the economy, where it hurts.  Large tuition hikes in a recession can 
deny students access to college, for example, and diminish not only their own long-term 
economic prospects but, over time, the overall quality of a state’s workforce. Reduced 
spending on transportation services and improvements can hinder both worker’s ability 
to get to jobs and the swift movement of goods and services, slowing economic activity. 
When economic times get 
rough, policymakers often 
neglect to make the tough 
decisions needed to put 
state budgets back on track, 
commonly resorting to  
one-time fixes that resolve 
the current deficit but do 
little or nothing to resolve 
more deeply-seated structural 
imbalances between revenues 
and expenditures.
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And health care services cuts can adversely affect physical and mental wellbeing, reduc-
ing productivity, and leading to the need for more costly treatment down the road.  
Nor does the political climate associated with eliminating deficits during an economic 
downturn tend to foster the development of sound, long-term policy decisions. Often 
times, instead, during crisis, policymakers resort to gimmicks or evasion, which can po-
tentially further put the state at risk. Some of the policy choices are more egregious than 
others—New York, for example, has borrowed from its pension fund in order to make its 
scheduled contribution back to it.  Meanwhile, fiscal pressures on a state ripple through to 
counties, cities, and school districts via reduced aid, diminished tax sharing, and increased 
spending requirements that create additional hardship.  These policy outcomes can have 
lasting economic effects and lead to future budget dilemmas necessitating additional 
spending cuts or tax increases.  Most notably, the local government layoffs and service 
cutbacks that frequently result from state deficit traumas and pass-throughs can depress 
spending, purchasing, and local contracting and place a serious drag on regional economic 
performance.8  In this respect, state-level grappling with cyclical and structural deficits—
and its impacts on localities—can become at a time of economic shakiness the equivalent 
of a massive “anti-stimulus,” as The Washington Post blogger Ezra Klein puts it.9 
III.  Estimating State Budget Deficits
The analysis of state budget deficits discussed in this brief focuses on three Intermoun-
tain states (Arizona, Colorado, and Nevada) and California, and extends from FY 2007 
through the current fiscal year.  The estimates of cyclical and structural deficits presented 
for each of these states are derived through a unique and consistent methodology that 
previously has been applied to Arizona.10   
A detailed description of the methodology can be found in the Appendix.  But three ca-
veats regarding the estimates are worth emphasizing here:  
First, the analysis does not account for capital expenditures and revenues/expenditures 
that do not flow through the general fund (e.g. pension fund contributions from the gen-
eral fund and long-term pension fund expenditure commitments); these other compo-
nents of the state budget may also suffer from imbalances that will not be captured here. 
Second, the measure of expenditure requirements is based on FY 2008, which may or 
may not reflect the long-term spending needs for a given state.  For Colorado, for ex-
ample, this takes the long-term influence of the Tax Payer Bill of Rights (TABOR) on the 
size of state government as a given:  The presumption is that the revenue and expen-
diture patterns induced by TABOR reflect the preferences of the electorate.11 (TABOR 
is described in more detail later.)  For all four states, at any rate, the analysis assumes 
stable economic and demographic patterns.  That is, there is no accounting for poten-
tially higher (lower) service delivery costs in future years, either due to differences in 
input costs or the scope of the population benefiting from service delivery.  In practice, 
there are demographic and economic pressures building in each of the states that have 
the potential to aggravate structural deficits in future years.    
Finally, the estimates are sensitive to the fiscal structure and the nature of political de-
cisionmaking in each state.  The expenditure policy changes that have transpired since 
the FY 2008 baseline are assumed to be temporary, since past experience indicates that 
recent cuts such as these are largely restored when revenues rebound.  If post-2008 
spending cuts prove to be permanent then the structural deficit estimates reported be-
low would be diminished.  Otherwise, no further changes in fiscal policy are built into the 
analysis.  However, future tax cuts or expenditure increases would add to the structural 
deficit problem confronting the states.
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IV. Cyclical and Structural Deficits in California and the  
Intermountain West
So: How serious are the state budget deficits faced by selected Intermountain West states 
and California?  A careful analysis of cyclical and structural deficits in Arizona, California, 
Colorado, and Nevada reveals a set of varied—though universally disconcerting—trends 
that point to the depth and nature of the fiscal crisis facing these states:  
All four of the Western states examined are under heavy fiscal stress.  The new analysis un-
derscores that Arizona, California, Colorado, and Nevada are all grappling with extraordinary 
general fund deficits that were revealed and exacerbated by the recent Great Recession.  For 
each state these shortfalls include a substantial cyclical deficit and for two states, Arizona 
and California, a large structural deficit as well.  A snapshot of both the cyclical and structural 
deficit estimates for 2011 is presented in Table 1, while Figure 1 shows ongoing revenues and 
expenditures per $1000 of personal income in each of the four states over time. 
Nevada has the largest cyclical deficit of the four states for FY 2011, when compared against 
2008 baseline expenditures, at 17 percent of general fund spending.  This is followed by Ari-
zona and California, each at 12 percent, with Colorado boasting the smallest gap of 9 percent. 
Estimates of the structural deficits in the four states are more varied.  Arizona has by 
far the largest estimated structural deficit for FY 2011 when compared against FY 2008 
baseline expenditures, standing at a mammoth 21 percent of general fund spending. 
This figure roughly equals total state spending on the university/board of regents system 
along with all state spending on protection and safety.  Nevada’s estimated structural 
deficit is only 1 percent of baseline general fund spending for the same year, while Colo-
rado boasts a structural surplus of 2 percent. The biggest dollar denominated structural 
deficit is in the largest of the four states, California, which has an imbalance of $9.2 bil-
lion; Nevada’s shortfall runs to only $33 million. 
As noted above, these estimates do not consider future economic and demographic 
trends and assume that the economy will in fact cycle back to its pre-recession levels. 
Fiscal Year Arizona California Colorado Nevada
TOTAL DEFICIT
2007 -1% -3% 7% -2%
2008 -14 -2 4 -9
2009 -31 -24 -10 -16
2010 -38 -27 -11 -16
2011 -33 -21 -7 -18
CYCLICAL DEFICIT
2007 17 5 5 3
2008 7 7 2 -4
2009 -11 -15 -12 -10
2010 -17 -18 -13 -15
2011 -12 -12 -9 -17
STRUCTURAL DEFICIT
2007 -18 -9 2 -5
2008 -20 -9 2 -5
2009 -21 -9 2 -5
2010 -21 -9 2 -1
2011 -21 -9 2 -1
Table 1. The magnitude and components of the deficits among the states vary considerably
Surpluses (positive) and deficits (negative) expressed as a percentage of stable expenditures
Source: Brookings Mountain West / Morrison Institute / ASU
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In this way they may paint a far rosier fiscal picture than is warranted, particularly in 
Nevada.  Given the massive long-term restructuring now likely underway of the state’s 
migration, gaming, and consumption-based economy, the Silver State almost certainly 
now suffers from a serious structural challenge that will manifest itself clearly in the com-
ing years.12  This issue is discussed in more detail below. 
Cyclical surpluses and deficits in the four states have fluctuated over the past five years 
while structural deficits have largely held steady.  All four states enjoyed cyclical sur-
pluses in FY 2007 as a percentage of stable expenditures and all but Nevada—which 
suffered from a 4 percent deficit—retained a cyclical surplus in FY 2008.  
That all changed as the economy tanked and revenue yields fell.  In FYs 2009 through 2011, 
all four states experienced a cyclical deficit.  While the size of the cyclical deficit in Arizona, 
California, and Colorado decreased several percentage points from FY 2010 to FY 2011, in 
Nevada it has continued to climb each year since it first appeared in FY 2008—a year ear-
lier, as noted above, than in the other states.
Arizona, for its part, saw the most dramatic swing during this five-year period, since it be-
gan with a far higher cyclical surplus (17 percent) than the other states in FY 2007 and 
thus experienced the largest reversal of fortunes. This swing owes to the way its particular 
revenue system interacts with the state’s extremely cyclical economy.  Arizona’s significant 
shifts in revenue over the last two decades, even after adjusting for tax law changes.
Structural deficits, meanwhile, remained stable over the past five fiscal years in Califor-
nia (at 9 percent of stable expenditures) and increased 3 percentage points in Arizona 
from 18 percent to 21 percent.  Permanent tax increases introduced since the onset 
of the recession have helped reduce the structural deficit in Nevada from 5 percent of 
stable expenditures in FYs 2007 through 2009 to just 1 percent in FY 2010 and 2011. 
Colorado, the outlier, experienced a stable structural surplus of 2 percent during the 
entire five-year period. 
Deficits in the four states are caused by a mix of factors. That all four of the states in 
this analysis are experiencing cyclical deficits—as are nearly all states in the nation—is 
not surprising.  Though the magnitude of the deficit varies somewhat among them, the 
source is largely the same: dramatic drops in revenue due to the recent recession and 
protracted economic downturn. As the economy slowly recovers, the cyclical deficit will 
decline and eventually become a cyclical surplus—but any underlying structural deficits 
will remain, poised to aggravate the next economic slump.
Structural deficits like those presented here represent longer-term imbalances between 
revenues and expenditures.  As discussed in section II, they arise from the complex inter-
action between the states’ fiscal and institutional structures, economic and demographic 
change, and, critically, policy decisions about taxing and spending. All of these factors 
have had some degree of influence on the structural deficit estimates for California and 
the Mountain states.  For example, a growing school-aged population on one end of the 
population pyramid and a growing graying population on the other has created expen-
diture pressures, while sales tax revenue growth has been weakened (beneath the wave 
of strong economic growth) by shifts in consumption toward largely untaxed services. 
These trends have been compounded by discretionary policy changes and voter initia-
tives that have both permanently diminished revenue productivity and increased spend-
ing on services over time to where the states simply cannot make ends meet. Constraints 
have also been introduced by voters that limit the revenue raising capacity of the states; 
all four Mountain states have some form of ongoing supermajority requirement over 
some facet of the budget.  
But while there are numerous common threads, understanding the causes of these 
states’ fiscal problems requires a state-by-state perspective.
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Arizona’s fiscal problem is largely, but not exclusively, rooted in policy 
actions that over time have significantly eroded the state’s available 
revenues.  From FY 1993 to 2010 the state cut all kinds of taxes, but 58 
percent of the total reductions in nominal dollars came from the per-
sonal income tax; these reductions gave rise to a structural deficit that 
predates the current economic cycle.  Nominally, the net changes dur-
ing this 17-year period totaled some $1.7 billion. Adjusting for inflation, 
population growth, and real per capita economic growth, the cumula-
tive impact climbs to $2.9 billion.13   
On the other side of the budget ledger, two major impacts on general 
fund expenditures have occurred since the structural deficit began in 
the early 1990s.  First, funding for school construction was shifted into 
the general fund in FY 1999, with no additional revenue being provid-
ed. The annual expense has been as high as $500 million.  Second, in 
2000 voters passed two competing ballot initiatives to expand Medicaid 
by using tobacco settlement monies. However, the specified funding 
source was inadequate to support the expansions, and additional fund-
ing had to be drawn from the general fund. As Figure 1 shows, though, 
overall general fund expenditures in the state have actually decreased 
over time.  
Meanwhile, Arizona confronts several constraints on fiscal flexibility 
that will make eliminating its massive structural deficit all the more challenging.  Most 
notably, the state’s requirement for a supermajority for any revenue increase will seri-
ously hinder revenue-side responses. While there are those who argue such a provision 
may protect the budget process from capricious increases in spending, it greatly compli-
cates prudent fiscal management. 
Unlike Arizona, California suffers from more of a spending problem 
than a revenue problem, a result of permanent spending increases that 
were introduced during years of economic expansion.  For example, the 
state significantly increased spending on education during the 1990s as 
the dot-com boom boosted the economy and personal income tax rev-
enues; further spending increases were implemented in the relatively 
healthy years of the mid-2000s.  
Voter mandates and other institutional constraints have further strained 
budgeting in California.  California’s Proposition 98—the Classroom In-
structional Improvement and Accountability Act passed in 1988—re-
quires that nearly one-half of all new revenue be dedicated to support 
schools.  While it is hard to argue against funding for education, the fact 
is that Proposition 98 reduces lawmakers’ ability to address the state’s 
structural deficit even as it hampers its ability to fund other programs. 
California also had required a two-thirds legislative majority to approve the state budget, 
one of only three states in the nation (along with Arkansas and Rhode Island) with such 
a requirement.  In the November 2010 election California voters approved an initiative 
requiring only a simple majority for budget approval.  However, the same voters also ap-
proved a measure that would require a two-thirds majority for not only any tax increases 
but fee increases as well.14  And then there is Proposition 13, the 1978 People’s Initiative 
to Limit Property Taxation, which has enshrined as an amendment to the California con-
stitution  limitations on local property tax revenue growth.  Proposition 13 has succeed-
ed in limiting local government revenue, but it has also depressed localities’ capacity to 
fund services from their own sources and placed significant new spending obligations on 
state government, adding to the structural deficit.15 
a. For this and the following three charts, the difference between the two lines represents 
the total deficit or surplus:  Where the expenditure line is higher, the difference is the total 
deficit; where the revenue line is higher, the difference is the total surplus.  However, the 
deficit indicated by a comparison of the two lines is definitionally different than the deficits 
estimated for this paper.
b.  One-time or temporary budget fixes are not included in the revenue figures.
c. Expressing the revenues and expenditures per $1,000 of personal income automati-
cally adjusts for inflation, population growth, and real per capita economic growth.
Figure 1.  Revenues in Arizona have dropped precipitously over 
the past several years following a series of permanent tax cuts 
implemented since the 1990’s.
Figure 2.  Until very recently spending in California has  
outpaced revenue collections.
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Colorado’s small structural surplus, meanwhile, is unique and reflects 
the influence of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, or TABOR, which was adopt-
ed as a constitutional amendment in 1992.  TABOR limits revenue and 
expenditure increases to the sum of population growth plus inflation. 
However, when revenues slow or contract as the economy slows, this 
establishes a lower budget threshold under the formula—the so-called 
“ratchet effect.” TABOR has led to a decline in the size of state govern-
ment in Colorado through both the population and inflation formula, 
and the ratchet effect.16   But while TABOR has helped Colorado avert a 
structural deficit as traditionally defined, this has come at the expense 
of state-provided public services.  For example, elementary and second-
ary education spending and spending for higher education have fallen 
to near the lowest levels in the nation among all states.  For the budget 
as a whole, ongoing expenditures were 4.1 percent of personal income 
in 1993 but had fallen to 3.1 percent of personal income by 2010.
Voters suspended the TABOR formula for five years in 2005, and it has now been reinstated 
with looser restrictions.  Indeed, Colorado voters generally appear to be increasingly re-
luctant to add more binding limits on budget growth.  The repudiation of the proposed 
Amendments 60, 61, and 101 in the November 2010 election, for example, offers strong 
evidence that voters are worried about further cuts in state services.  These proposed 
amendments would have reduced local property taxes (shifting school finance burdens to 
the state), limited state and local debt, and reduced the state’s personal income tax rate. 
Nevada’s cyclical deficits in FYs 2009 and 2010 resembled those in the 
other four states, but instead of narrowing in FY 2011 as in the other 
states, these shortfalls have continued to grow. This may be the result 
of a conservative forecast by the state, one complicated by Nevada’s 
budget running on a biennial cycle.
At any rate, Nevada’s fiscal challenges go beyond the current period, 
however, with constraints on revenue capacity and decisionmaking an 
enduring issue.  The sales tax rate is written into the constitution, for 
example, and there is a constitutional prohibition against an income 
tax.  Earmarks and formula mandates also limit Nevada’s fiscal flexibility 
and discretion, with over 50 percent of revenues dedicated to support-
ing specific spending programs.  These restrictions have already led, 
in better times, to a serious legal crisis: In 2004, the Nevada Supreme 
Court intervened following a budget impasse that involved a proposed 
controversial tax increase, ruling that the constitutional requirement to fund schooling 
trumped the state’s supermajority requirement for increasing taxes.17   
Nevada’s near-term structural deficit reflects a small mismatch between expenditure 
commitments relative to taxes.  However, pressures on the budget will be acute in com-
ing years, reducing the likelihood that the state can avoid creation of a more serious 
structural imbalance down the road.  Economic and demographic trends in particular are 
not favorable from a budget perspective.  The region’s sunny climate, along with now-
reduced housing costs, will eventually again attract new residents, but, given its excess 
existing housing stock, this won’t lead to a commensurate increase in property and sales 
tax revenues.  Meanwhile, the expected growth in its elderly and school-aged popula-
tion will mean higher expenditure commitments.  At the same time, the employment 
and wealth shocks of the recession will likely temper growth in gaming revenues, while 
growth in gaming opportunities outside of Nevada, including Internet gaming, will put 
further downward pressure on the state’s most important economic sector.  Together the 
economic and demographic trends will interact with the tax system to create an espe-
cially harsh budget climate throughout the decade such that this state, which does not 
now struggle with a large structural deficit, will likely gain one.
Figure 3.  TABOR has kept Colorado’s spending and revenues in 
line but led to serious declines in both.
Figure 4. During the economic downturn revenues in Nevada 
have declined as spending rose.
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V. State Impacts, Recent Responses, and Continuing Implications
Cyclical and structural budget imbalances of the scale roiling California and the Mountain 
states have already had, and will continue to have, disturbing practical consequences.
Most notably, dramatic spending cuts have already caused significant reductions in ser-
vice provision across critical program areas, including especially education and the social 
safety net. What is more, state distress is also exacerbating local budget distress, as the 
states have increasingly reduced aid to local governments in order to redirect money to 
the general fund to make up for reduced tax revenue collections.18 
And yet, for all the painful actions states have taken in the last two years to close their 
recent budget gaps, little has yet been done to address the longer-term structural pres-
sures on revenues and expenditures.  Instead, a considerable share of increased revenue 
generated by these states over the recent cycle has come from one-time fixes like asset 
sales and the draining of rainy day funds rather than through permanent, if more dif-
ficult, revenue enhancements.  At the same time, policymakers continue to ignore the 
crucial need to update outmoded revenue systems to better reflect economic and de-
mographic shifts.  While tax reform is challenging, a failure to modernize state revenue 
systems puts states in a poor position for the next economic downturn.19   
A state-by-state synopsis of recent budgetary actions illustrates at once the pain being in-
flicted by the states’ efforts to address their fiscal challenges and the largely shortsighted 
nature of those efforts:20   
Arizona:  Arizona has relied disproportionately on temporary or one-time measures to 
close budget gaps rather than permanent repairs to the tax and expenditure system, de-
spite the fact that many of the problems are long run in nature.  For example, a temporary 
one-cent sales tax rate increase was implemented in 2010 with great controversy to help 
close a budget gap that was well over $1 billion. The state also garnered national atten-
tion for its asset sales, which included the state Capitol and Supreme Court building.  Of 
the $12.5 billion in total budget adjustments since 2008, 80 percent of the balancing act 
has been realized by one-time measures.21   On the other side of the budget, meanwhile, 
the cuts have already been sharp and painful. Educational funding reductions from the 
general fund have been significant to the point that from FY 2008 to 2010 K-12 funding 
declined 20 percent while university budgets were cut 28 percent.22  Some of this reduc-
tion has been temporarily masked by additional federal stimulus dollars. Those, however, 
are coming to an end. Likewise, the state halved the school day for kindergartners earlier 
this year to free up $218.3 million.23   In another move the state reduced the lifetime 
eligibility for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits to just 36 months 
from 60 months, revoking support for 8,200 families.24  Further, the state recently cut off 
financing for certain organ transplants under the Arizona’s Health Care Cost Containment 
System, the state’s version of Medicaid.25 
California:  California enacted the 2010 Budget Act in October to address a shortfall of 
$19.3 billion in the FY 2011 budget.  Together nearly $8 billion in ongoing and temporary 
service cuts along with $3.3 billion in additional revenues were included in the bud-
get.  Of the total package, about one-third represent one-time or temporary fixes:  The 
state assumed that the federal government would contribute $5.4 billion in yet-to-be ap-
proved assistance, while one-time efforts produced $2.7 billion in funds, including $1.2 
billion funds from the sale of 11 office buildings that it would then lease back from the 
buyer. Spending was also slashed, and included $3.3 billion in reductions and deferrals to 
the state’s K-14 education system for 2011, as well as myriad health and social services 
cutbacks.  The Office of AIDS saw a $52.1 million budget reduction, for example, the 
Department of Mental Health’s budget was cut by $82.4 million, and funding for Child 
Welfare Services dropped $80 million.  There was also a one-time $70 million reduction 
in state benefits for Seriously Emotionally Disturbed children in foster care.26 
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Impacts in Arizona: State Aid Cuts Hit Rural and Urban Counties Alike
Arizona’s current 12 percent cyclical deficit and whopping 21 percent structural shortfall are forcing headline-grabbing state govern-
ment cuts to education and services.  Less covered but nearly as disruptive are the grinding, now intensifying impacts of the crisis on 
the state’s rural and urban counties. 
Arizona’s 15 counties—which manage such critical matters as public safety, health, economic development, and land management—
have been working since 2007 to adjust their budgets in response to the economic downturn by laying off personnel, reducing service 
levels, tapping financial reserves, eliminating non-mandated programs, and decreasing capital projects and road building.  But even 
as county leaders have struggled to get their own fiscal houses in order, the reality of shared state revenue and program responsibil-
ity and the need to balance the state budget has piled on an additional load of fiscal burdens. Put simply, the state’s budget problems 
are now dragging these local governments into crisis, with troubling implications for both rural and urban Arizonans.
All told, from FY 2008 to FY 2011, Arizona counties suffered a collective loss of $193.6 million due to the state’s budget woes.  State-
wide program shifts, where the state pushes the cost of a particular mandated program further downstream onto localities, have 
cost counties $44.6 million over these past four budgets.  And county receipts of Highway User Revenue Fund monies have fallen by 
$40.4 million. County transfers (i.e. the statutorily required transfer of tax dollars from the county to the state general fund) and lost 
revenue streams from, for example, the elimination of counties’ share of lottery revenues, account for the remaining $108.6 million.
The fiscal impacts of these state-induced revenue drops vary across the state’s counties, particularly between its rural and urban ju-
risdictions.  Rural counties, for their part, are hamstrung by a very limited tax base, a result of both their small populations and state 
legislation passed in the early 2000s that requires hard-to-gain voter approval for any tax hikes.  This lack of flexibility leaves these 
counties’ hands tied and unable to react nimbly to volatility in the economy, and the whims of the state.  The nearly 40,000 residents 
of Graham County, for example, have experienced first hand the combined impacts of the state’s fiscal laxity—which has translated 
into a $1.01 million loss for the county in FY 2011 alone—and the county’s own downturn-related budgetary shortfalls.22   Plans to 
improve and expand the county jail have been halted, for instance, forcing Graham to use its already scarce resources to transport 
female prisoners to a neighboring county.  Similarly, it has had to table a Gila River bridge reconstruction project such that five dozen 
of its citizens must travel an extra 20 miles to access schools and the nearest community.  With reserves gone and no ability to raise 
taxes, any additional state impacts will necessitate dramatic reductions in full-time county staff, the numbers of which have already 
been cut by 10 percent.   
Meanwhile, Arizona’s urban counties have had their own fiscal struggles.  The capital county of Maricopa displays what is happen-
ing. The County Supervisors Association of Arizona reports that the state has burdened Maricopa County alone with $116 million in 
extra expenses since FY 2008, ranging from one-way transfers (to the tune of $77.3 million), to reductions in shared revenues, to the 
shifting of responsibilities for certain programs like juvenile corrections.  Maricopa has acted swiftly to keep its budget in balance 
going into the downturn—but its largely successful efforts have come at a hefty price.  The number of county staff has been cut by 
10 percent since 2007 to approximately 12,500, and it has been forced to make drastic reductions in non-mandated and non-voter-
protected services, especially human services. Meals-on-Wheels and the Special Needs Transportation program—which provided 
home-delivered meals and rides for the elderly and disabled—have both been suspended indefinitely, demonstrating in very real 
terms how the state’s balance sheet problems fall upon its most vulnerable residents. 
All of this is hitting counties just as their own revenues, which lag cyclical developments in the economy by about two years, reach 
their low points.  Developing a county budget for FY 2011-12 will be the most challenging yet.  In addition to the ongoing legislative 
impacts enacted to date, local revenues continue to be anemic, and mandated payments to the Arizona long-term care system are 
expected to shoot up about $80 million as enhanced federal assistance to the state expires. Making matters worse, eight counties 
have experienced substantial reductions in their local property tax base (as much as 11 percent) due to home devaluation, creating 
significant political pressure to reduce property taxes.  
As county leaders continue to try to balance dwindling resources with needed local service delivery, they face the unsettling fact that the 
fate of their operations may largely be determined by how state lawmakers choose to deal with Arizona’s fiscal deficit—and the extent 
to which they will continue to off-load major expenses to the county taxpayer. Their fear is informed by history.  In recent years, legislative 
proposals put on the table included increasing the counties’ share of state health care costs, and transferring state juvenile corrections 
responsibilities and thousands of adult prisoners to county facilities.  Though rejected at the time, state leaders just may well entertain 
similar concepts again.  For Arizona counties, then, the worst may be yet to come.
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Colorado: Balancing the FY 2010-2011 budget gap of $1.2 billion required an array of 
initiatives, including temporary suspension of the homestead property tax credit for se-
niors.27 Two additional rounds of reductions have been required since the 2009-2010 
budget was enacted. The most recent cuts, in October, included $231.8 million to higher 
education, $92.1 million to Medicaid, and $122.5 million to corrections.28
Nevada:  The state’s budget collapsed in response to sagging sales and gaming tax receipts 
as construction ground to a near halt and tourism activity slumped. In response, the sales 
tax rate has been increased (by 0.35 percentage points), and modifications have been made 
to business, hotel, and business license taxes.29  General fund spending, meanwhile, fell 12.6 
percent in FY 2010 compared to the previous year. The state made cuts to all major program 
areas in 2010, including education, public assistance, Medicaid, corrections, and transporta-
tion. K-12 and higher education funding were each dealt 6.9 percent cuts for FY 2011 during 
a special session of the Legislature in February, 2010, as the state attempted to plug an $887 
million hole in its balance sheet.30   The National Association of State Budget Officers reports 
that further reductions are planned for all of these areas in 2011, with the exception of trans-
portation.  The outlook next year is even bleaker: Nevada lawmakers will confront a projected 
$2.5 to $3 billion shortfall in the FY 2012-2013 biennial budget of over $8 billion. 31  
And yet, those are only the initial impacts and responses in the four states—and, unfor-
tunately, their budget situations are likely to get worse before they get better.  In fact, 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) projects a continued deterioration in the 
budget outlook for the states for decades to come absent fundamental policy changes 
that address core imbalances between revenues and spending.32   
There are several interrelated reasons that the future looks so grim: 
First, it will take years for levels of economic activity to return to their pre-recession 
peaks:  Job growth will likely remain anemic while unemployment rates will remain stub-
bornly high, perhaps through the entire decade. The upshot is that the revenue side of 
state budgets will not likely fully rebound in Arizona, California, and Colorado until 2013 
or 2014. Revenues in Nevada, meanwhile, may not return to their previous peaks until 
the latter part of the present decade, as the housing and tourism boom that preceded 
the recession is not likely to be repeated any time soon.  As economic growth is slowly 
restored, meanwhile, sales tax growth is likely to be muted.  Fewer homes will be built, 
consumers will increasingly purchase largely untaxed services, and the need to replen-
ish household savings will dampen overall consumption spending.  These trends will hit 
Nevada particularly hard, as well as the other 45 states with a sales tax.
Secondly, however dire states’ fiscal situations may become, with the withdrawal of fed-
eral fiscal stimulus funds in 2011, and little chance of further relief in store, states will 
almost certainly be left to their own devices.  Stabilization funds embedded in the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act ensured that education spending did not fall below 
“maintenance of effort” levels, but maintenance will become more difficult to achieve 
without the influx of federal funds.  Additional cuts in education spending from pre-K 
to higher education will likely be the result.  The increased federal matching rate for 
Medicaid spending will also end in 2011 and absent the full restoration of state revenues 
more service cuts can be expected.  Arizona alone is looking at the loss of $800 million in 
federal Medicaid funds in 2011, and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimates 
that eliminated services have impacted approximately 1 million enrollees.33  
And then there is the potential for new federal mandates—a third unwelcome possible 
impact.  In this respect, not only can the states no longer look to Washington for fiscal 
support, but, given the federal government’s own budget challenges, they can also ex-
pect federal mandates to grow.  A case in point is the higher health care costs associated 
with national health insurance reform.  While reform will achieve the goal of bringing 
large numbers of the uninsured into the service net, it offers no effective means of fos-
tering health care cost containment.  Moreover, a significant financing burden will be 
shifted to the states after the initial period of transition.  
Unfortunately, the states’ 
budget situations are likely 
to get worse before they 
get better. 
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In sum, while cyclical surpluses will return to the region—eventually and temporarily—
the stark fact remains that California and many of the Intermountain states face a very 
bleak fiscal prognosis.
First off, when revenues do eventually recover to pre-recession peaks, the states will face 
a pent-up demand for the full range of publicly provided services.  Public employees will 
have gone several years without pay raises, infrastructure maintenance has been put off, 
and no public service program will have seen any improvements—to the contrary, these 
programs have been cut.  Difficult choices will have to be made over which spending 
cuts to restore and how to address spending needs that have been ignored—decisions 
made all the more difficult as the imperative of replenishing the states’ diminished or 
emptied rainy day and other funds looms.34   Aggravating all these burdens will be de-
mographic trends, including more children to serve in the public schools, and a growing, 
aging population in need of increasingly expensive health care services.  All the while, 
rising anti-tax sentiment will make it exceedingly difficult to raise taxes or broaden tax 
bases to pay for growing encumbrances, however essential or unavoidable they may be. 
In the end California and the Intermountain states must look within and make wise policy 
choices to address their cyclical and structural fiscal imbalances, including not just stra-
tegic program cuts, but also the tax reforms essential to improving revenue streams over 
the long haul.  Inaction is an option that will only lead to unending budget pressures that 
will ultimately undermine the economic prosperity of these states and their residents. 
VI. Narrowing the Gap: Reducing Cyclical and Structural  
Budget Deficits and Improving State Fiscal Stability
The deficits confronting California and the Intermountain states are enormous.  Though 
the states’ cyclical shortfalls will start to fade as the economy improves, a host of forces 
will conspire to place heavy upward pressure on structural deficits.  Responding to those 
dynamics will not be easy and will require a relentlessly strategic approach to both re-
ducing expenditures and reforming revenue structures.
What is more, such a response is going to require better than budgetary business-as-
usual in these states as reflected in ratings like those issued by the Pew Center on the 
States’ Government Performance Initiative.  In 2008 the Center assigned grades of C+, 
D+, C+, and C+ to Arizona, California, Colorado, and Nevada, respectively, for their fiscal 
management practices—grades below the average state grade.35   
And so these four states need to break with their past budgeting habits and move urgently 
to inaugurate—starting now—more prudent, strategic, and better-informed tax, spending, 
and budget planning practices.  To this end, a broad principle should be adopted to ensure 
that permanent policy changes on one side of the budget are matched by permanent policy 
changes on the other side of the budget. More specifically, two sorts of steps need to be 
taken to begin reducing these states’ present structural gaps and preventing their return. 
First, states need to improve the quality of their fiscal policymaking by steadily working to 
broaden, balance, and diversify their revenue bases while looking to the long-haul balance of 
taxing and spending. And, second, these states need to improve the information sharing and 
budgeting processes through which fiscal problems are identified, analyzed, and addressed. 
Each of these changes will require of leaders substantial self-discipline. 
Improving Fiscal Stability Through Better Policymaking
Questionable past policy decisions have played a large role in the emergence of significant 
structural deficits in California and the Mountain states.  It follows, therefore, that improved 
policymaking represents the key to improved fiscal stability going forward.  To that end, law-
makers in these states should embrace a number of widely recognized tenets of good manage-
ment that ensure appropriate responses to a fluid economic and fiscal environment, including 
the ability to meet changing and newly emerging budgetary needs. These tenets—which in-
clude balanced approaches, broad tax bases, diverse revenue sources, and a close fit of revenue 
adequacy to necessary expenditures—should motivate of number of concrete actions:
California and the  
Intermountain states must 
look within and make wise 
policy choices to address their 
cyclical and structural fiscal 
imbalances, including not just 
strategic program cuts, but 
also the tax reforms essential 
to improving revenue streams 
over the long haul.
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Commit to a balanced approach.  Budgetary balance and revenue diversification are 
crucial.  Diversification can ensure greater adaptation to economic and demographic 
changes, though there can be no absolute protection against the vagaries of the busi-
ness cycle.  In view of that, lawmakers should embrace balance as a key watchword as 
they seek to stabilize year-to-year finances and narrow structural gaps.  One sort of bal-
ance should be a balance of revenue-and spending-side responses:  The region’s massive 
budget gaps cannot responsibly be closed with only spending reductions. Yet there is 
another sort of balance that should be sought and that is the sort of revenue system bal-
ance that arises from diversification of the tax system.  Nevada, for example, has one of 
the least diversified tax systems in the country, and relies disproportionately on sales and 
gaming revenue. Consideration could be given there to variants of the new business ac-
tivity taxes, like the commercial activities tax in Ohio or the “margins” tax in Texas, since 
these gross receipts taxes may not run afoul of the state’s constitution.36   In Arizona, 
meanwhile, the proliferation of tax reductions implemented since the early 1990s have 
made the revenue system not only narrower but also more subject to cyclical variations 
in the economy.  Both states need to commit to a more balanced approach.
Broaden tax bases and improve their responsiveness.  In addition to balance and diver-
sification, broad bases and tax system responsiveness should be mantras of fiscal system 
repair. Tax policies that increase the base and elasticity of state tax systems would help 
mitigate structural deficits and reduce the need for discretionary rate increases.  For 
example, expanding the sales tax base to include more consumer services would both 
account for the growing importance of services in the economy and increase the tax’s 
revenue yield.37 Now, of course, it is true that elastic tax systems are a two-edged sword, 
producing strong revenue gains when the economy grows but also contracting sharply 
during recessions.  Personal income tax systems are a good example, often producing 
significant revenue growth with growth in the economy, though this increased revenue is 
often given back to taxpayers via rate reduction or used to support unsustainable spend-
ing programs.  Going forward, the new revenues could be used to enhance rainy day fund 
balances and so bring greater stability to the overall system.  
Commit to maintaining adequate rainy day funds.  With the exception of Colorado, the 
Mountain states all exhausted their rainy day funds well before relieving their acute fiscal 
stress.  (Colorado tries to retain idle balances but it does not have a formal rainy day fund.) 
As the economy gets back on its feet, state governments need to not just replenish, but 
increase the size of their rainy day funds so that they can better weather protracted eco-
nomic downturns. These funds must balance the loss of private consumption when excess 
revenues are saved during periods of fiscal health against sustained public service delivery 
during periods when revenue collections are diminished.38   Local governments typically 
maintain and shift forward significant idle balances in their general funds. They, too, should 
develop formal rainy day funds to support accountability and transparency while enabling 
an enhanced fiscal response to weak economic conditions.  Rainy day funds can help ad-
dress cyclical revenue shortfalls as well as diminish the otherwise dire consequences on 
the budget arising from a structural imbalance in the midst of recession.  A properly estab-
lished rainy day fund designed to smooth cyclical revenue and expenditure flows would 
also help expose the scope of any underlying structural deficit.   
Increase local flexibility and control. State legislators and voters (via statewide ballot ini-
tiatives) have a history of passing measures that constrain local governments’ ability to 
raise revenues and respond to changing fiscal circumstances.  Capping the property taxes 
that localities are permitted to levy—a measure imposed by Arizona’s state legislature on 
localities, for example—severely constrains fiscal flexibility at the local level, where govern-
ments are similarly mandated by law to maintain a balanced budget.  Local governments 
exist in an asymmetric relationship with states as well: They are dependent on states for 
large portions of their budgets and can be forced via state mandates to pick up unexpected 
tabs, as they have been in Arizona.  (See sidebar.) Local governments in California, too, 
contend with an increasingly unbalanced system as a result of Proposition 13, which limits 
property tax collections in the state.  And municipal governments in Nevada are fiscally 
constrained by having much lower own-source revenue than in the average state.  In a 
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2008 National League of Cities report, Christopher Hoene and Michael Pagano offer a se-
ries of recommendations that can accommodate greater local control over revenue gen-
eration and public service provision, under the premise that local governments can assure 
greater public service accountability with voters than can higher levels of government. The 
recommendations include access to a variety of general tax instruments (sales, property, 
and income), increased state aid, and fewer tax and spending limitations.39   
Improving Policymaking through Better Budget Processes and Information Sharing
There are, however, no easy answers to complicated budget puzzles.  And for that rea-
son, sound processes and quality information about real and projected conditions and 
the range of policy options and their consequences are critical to improved policymak-
ing.  What processes and sorts of information would make a difference?  Above all, a sol-
id and common foundation of data and information is a necessary prerequisite to good 
citizenship and policymaking, but this is often lacking in practice.  Detailed time series 
data on state budgets are typically not easily accessible by the public, both within and 
across states.  Nevada is a case in point as government websites offer little in the form of 
useful data and narrative on the recent budget crisis and the state’s response.  This near 
vacuum can severely impede discussion, debate, and the implementation of good policy.
In order to reach a sustainable fiscal trajectory states should move to:
Report budgets in a transparent manner.  Budget problems are of sufficient complexity during 
periods of economic and fiscal health.  But the problems are of considerably greater complexity 
and much more acute in the midst of crisis.  States should therefore report critical budget data 
in a user-friendly format along with interpretative narrative on state government web pages. 
Copious data should be easily available online.  Budget guides for the public and legislators 
should explain in clear language historical budget patterns, current budget policy issues, and 
the long-term pressures on public finances.40   Such information will help lawmakers and the 
public understand the implications of their decisions for the state’s budget future. Transparency 
is essential to accountability and sound policymaking for both states and their localities.41   
Stability in Utah: Maintaining Balance With Good Information and Sound Processes
One Mountain state that does not contend with massive budget problems is Utah.  The Beehive State faces only modest cyclical defi-
cits currently and had no structural one until a round of tax reductions took effect in FY 2008 and 2009.45   Why is this?  One reason 
is that the state was relatively less invested in the housing boom that led to the recent real estate crash and associated budget disas-
ters of the Great Recession.46  But another influence on the state’s enviable condition has been its strong embrace of quality budget 
information and sound budget processes.  
In Utah, planning and budgeting are undertaken as a collaborative process and are so well informed by good data and strong processes 
that in 2008  the state garnered “A” grades on both fronts from the Pew Government Performance Project, which named it the best man-
aged state in the union.47   Epitomized by the Performance Elevated initiative instituted in 2004 by then-incoming Gov. Jon Huntsman Jr., and 
continued by current Gov. Gary Herbert, the Utah approach centers on the aggressive use of common data and the pro-active alignment 
of year-to-year expenditures with the long-term strategic direction of the state.  In this fashion, all agencies and both branches of state 
government use the same data, adopt agreed-upon targets, and align budgetary priorities in a strategic, collaborative process built on the 
collection, interpretation, and dissemination of quality information.  Budget requests are tied to agency performance measures as well as 
the state’s strategic plan.  Annual reviews ensure that budgets remain lean by flagging ineffective programs and unanticipated operational 
expenses. And for its part the legislative branch utilizes the same financial system and the same measures as the executive, allowing deci-
sions by both branches to be based on the same data.  Above all the public’s access to fiscal and process information is unfettered.
Such practices—with their attention to both good data and good processes—have meanwhile seemed to work.  In dealing with im-
mediate issues, the availability of fine-grained, timely information about state activities and finances enabled the governor and legis-
lature to act swiftly to slash expenditures surgically and strategically rather than bluntly to close the $272 million, 5 percent projected 
budget gap for FY 2009.48 Regarding the bigger picture, the state’s processes also seem to be helping it manage long-term issues:  As 
Pew notes, the state is managing its long-term pension liability well and carries relatively little debt.  In sum, routine, evidence- and 
process-driven review has enabled one Mountain West state to catch an incipient structural deficit early and act intentionally to 
rectify it before it becomes entrenched.   
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Adopt multi-year budgeting.  Fiscal year budgets and two- and four-year election cycles 
can easily be in conflict with one another.  Multi-year budgets that cross election cycles 
and seek to measure structural budget deficits would help overcome these inherent fric-
tions.  Moreover, policymakers would be confronted by the fiscal consequences of per-
manent changes to the tax and expenditure mix that can lead to or aggravate a structural 
deficit.  Long-term liabilities like pension fund commitments should also be fully account-
ed for in accessible budget reports.  The states’ present approach to capital budgeting, 
meanwhile, offers little clarity on investments, their return, and the consequences for 
long-term financial obligation. Sinking funds and schedules of debt liability repayment 
exist, but seldomly fully rationalize capital spending in the eyes of the public.  Transpar-
ency using fully integrated capital and multi-year budgets would offer greater assurance 
of accountability for many spending deferrals and any sweeping of fund balances during 
periods of fiscal stress.  According to the National Association of State Budget Officers 
the capital budgeting plan is nine years in Nevada, but only five years in California, only 
three years in Colorado, and just one year in Arizona.42  Short time frames for capital 
budgeting simply do not make good sense from a planning and long-term financial per-
spective.  Comprehensive multi-year budgets would help demonstrate the long-term 
consequences of prevailing fiscal policy as well as changes to the tax/expenditure mix.
Account for policy changes with long-term impacts.  Multi-year, long-term fiscal notes 
should be used for significant changes to tax and expenditure policies.  Projecting chang-
es to revenue streams and expenditure programs can be problematic in practice.  But the 
process of discovery associated with developing such projections can inform the policy 
debate and keep the electorate informed.  
Improve tax expenditure reporting.  Giveaways of the tax base in the form of new and 
ongoing exemptions and incentives that typically receive no formal budgetary account-
ing are key contributors to state structural distress.  Such giveaways include the largely 
wholesale exemptions from sales tax bases of services, discretionary incentives to pro-
mote economic development, and preferences granted under personal and corporate 
income taxes. Tax expenditure reports should be developed on an ongoing basis to al-
low citizens and policymakers to observe the near-term and long-term consequences of 
exemptions to state taxation.  Nevada does not provide a tax expenditure report of any 
form; Colorado’s most recent report considered only exemptions under the state sales 
tax; and the full documentation of tax expenditure reports is not available online for Cali-
fornia.  None of the states in this analysis provide forward-looking estimates of tax ex-
penditures and none provide any narrative explaining why the tax expenditures were put 
in place.43  Data on these costs would surely help reduce such giveways and loopholes.
Educate citizens about the fiscal implications of referenda. Voter rights for referenda 
and citizen initiatives empower state residents, whose voices need to be heard and re-
spected.  But voter mandates can have unintended, or at least not well understood, 
budgetary consequences, particularly when economic, demographic, and/or fiscal con-
ditions shift after the initiatives were approved.  Legislators can wind up hamstrung, 
without sufficient flexibility to make needed and appropriate policy changes that are 
responsive to those changing conditions.  Therefore, state governments should work 
with universities and other groups to provide unbiased, readily accessible, and transpar-
ent information to voters on how proposed referenda are likely to impact budgets in the 
short and longer term so that they can carefully weigh the benefits of new mandates 
against their fiscal implications before making their decisions at the ballot box.   
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VII. Conclusion
California and the Intermountain states have implemented massive budget cuts, a mix 
of temporary and permanent tax increases, and a number of one-time budget tricks to 
manage the largest deficits in modern history.  The scope of public service reduction has 
been unprecedented, affecting education, public health, public safety, and other essen-
tial service categories—and ultimately undermining states’ ability to build strong, resilient 
economies.  Further problems are on the immediate horizon with the upcoming loss of 
fiscal stimulus funds from the federal government and the expectation of a tepid economic 
expansion.  The states have positioned themselves poorly to address near-term pressures 
on fiscal finances and have done little to mitigate long-term structural imbalances.
The ultimate return to economic and fiscal health will be slow and painful.  The legacy of 
huge cyclical deficits will last for years and potentially mask underlying structural imbal-
ances for the states.  Policymakers can choose to ignore these deficits as they have done 
in the past, setting up another budget calamity that will emerge at the onset of the next 
business cycle.  Alternatively, steps can be taken now to at once close cyclical gaps and 
address long-term budget imbalances in ways that will reduce the adverse consequences 
of revenue shortfalls when they next emerge.  
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Appendix: Detailed Description of Methodology
This analysis of structural deficits is limited to the state government general fund in four 
Western states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada.  It extends from FY 2007 through 
the current fiscal year.   FY 2011 in each of these states runs from July 1, 2010 through 
June 30, 2011. The FY 2011 data consist of projected revenues and the latest appropria-
tion figures in each state. In some states, actual figures for FY 2010 were not yet available 
by mid-October, so projections had to be used.
Measuring revenues and expenditures
To the degree possible, revenue numbers used in this analysis are limited to “ongoing” 
revenues. This excludes transfers to and from the general fund from other funds (e.g. 
rainy day funds) and other one-time revenues (e.g. federal stimulus dollars).  Expendi-
tures are also “ongoing,” but the raw data include a few unusual one-time expenditures 
that were adjusted for in the analysis. 
Calculations were made based on revenues and expenditures per $1,000 of personal in-
come. Personal income, produced by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, is a measure 
of the size of the economy of each state, reflecting population growth, inflation, and real 
per person economic growth.  Personal income was selected instead of gross product 
for three key reasons: (1) gross product is much slower to be released (the latest data 
are for 2008); (2) personal income is available quarterly, such that an annual average for 
the fiscal year can be calculated; and (3) personal income is the most common measure 
used by states that have in place a revenue and/or expenditure limitation. In order to 
calculate revenues and expenditures per $1,000 of personal income through the current 
fiscal year, a projection had to be made of personal income in FY 2011 (the latest actual 
data are for second quarter 2010).49 
Because each state defines its general fund differently, the levels of revenues and ex-
penditures cannot be compared across states. For example, in some states, a particular 
program may be funded through a dedicated fund, while in other states that program 
may be part of the general fund. The inclusion of capital expenditures in the general 
fund also varies by state.  The direction and magnitude of the change in revenues and 
expenditures over time are more comparable across states, however.  This assumes that 
substantial changes in state versus local government responsibilities, or in the use of the 
state general fund versus a special state fund, did not occur (none were identified).
Obtaining a historical time series of revenues by source and expenditures by category 
was difficult in some of the states. Only Arizona and California had a readily available 
time series already in electronic form. In each state, revenue and/or expenditure data 
obtained from different state agencies frequently are not consistent due to differing ac-
counting systems used by the various agencies. In addition, some of the time series data 
obtained proved to consist of original appropriations, for example, rather than the final 
actual figures. While care was taken to obtain consistent figures in each state, it is ac-
knowledged that inconsistencies may exist in the raw data series used in each state.
Measuring deficits 
No standard method of estimating budget deficits exists and the calculation of budget defi-
cits is complicated by data inconsistencies, missing data, and the need to make multiple 
assumptions. Thus, more than one estimate of the deficit can and does exist in each state.
For this study a specific method was used to estimate the deficits in each state, though 
special circumstances in Arizona required that a variant of the methodology be used.50 
Thus, using a normalized measure, the results of this analysis can be compared across 
the four states.  Most commonly, the deficit for each year is expressed as a share of ap-
propriations. However, this is not an ideal measure since the magnitude of the deficit 
will appear to be larger in states that have aggressively combated the deficit through 
spending reductions. Therefore, in this study the deficit is compared to what expen-
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ditures would have been had reductions not occurred as a result of having to balance 
the budget. The representative expenditure figure (per $1,000 of personal income) is 
defined as the figure immediately prior to recession-caused reductions in expenditures. 
It is held steady in each year and multiplied by personal income in each year to obtain the 
modeled expenditures against which the sizes of the deficits are measured.
Total deficit
The first step in this analysis was to estimate the size of the total deficit (or surplus). The 
total deficit (or surplus) is simply the imbalance between revenues and expenditures. 
However, the estimated size of the total deficit depends on various assumptions, so dif-
ferent analysts will come up with differing estimates. Most commonly, a publicized deficit 
in the general fund refers to the projected shortfall of revenues relative to appropriations 
in the current fiscal year. Appropriations are set at the beginning of a fiscal year, typically 
equal to the projection of all revenues (including one-time transfers) during the year.  If 
actual revenue flows are less than projected revenues, a deficit develops that must be 
eliminated by the end of the fiscal year, due to state governments’ balanced budget re-
quirement. Estimates of the size of the deficit vary over time as revenues fluctuate, and 
the estimate at any point in time may vary from one analyst to the next depending on 
their projection of revenue during the year.
This study uses an alternative definition, with the deficit calculation based, as noted 
above, only on ongoing revenues and ongoing expenditures.  It excludes one-time trans-
fers into the general fund and other actions taken to produce a balanced budget in a 
given year, including temporary tax increases and temporary spending reductions.   Es-
timates of the deficit sometimes ignore even permanent changes in revenues and ex-
penditures that were made in response to a deficit.  In this study, permanent revenue 
changes implemented in the last few years are considered in the calculation of the base-
line deficit.  Spending cuts made in the last few years are excluded from the calculation, 
however—even if the cuts are labeled as permanent—because of the history of spend-
ing reductions that are made during a recession to balance the budget generally being 
reversed after the economy improves.  
In the calculation of the total deficit, actual ongoing revenue per $1,000 of personal in-
come was adjusted for temporary revenue changes for each year from FY 2007 through 
FY 2011. This adjusted revenue was compared to the representative spending level.  FY 
2008 was selected as representative in order to best remove the cyclical influences on 
spending—the temporary reductions that had occurred as a result of the 2001-02 reces-
sion had been made up, to the extent that legislators chose to offset the earlier spending 
reductions, and the new reductions in expenditures due to the latest recession had not 
yet begun.   The selected expenditure figure was adjusted for any known one-time aber-
rations that occurred during that year. 
The study compares the estimates of the total deficit (in nominal dollars) to other esti-
mates that have been made. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), a Wash-
ington, D.C.-based organization, has collected estimates of the total deficit from each 
state, publishing figures for each year from FY 2009 through FY 2012 in a report last 
updated on October 7, 2010.  However, because of the multiple ways in which legislative 
budget offices, governor’s offices of planning and budget, and other organizations calcu-
late these deficits, the estimates from state to state may not be comparable. Even within 
a state, the method used to estimate the deficit may have varied over the four years.  For 
example, in both Arizona and California, the reported deficit in FY 2010 is much higher 
than that in the preceding or succeeding years. This may result from the addition of any 
remaining deficit in the prior year to the estimated deficit for the next year, which results 
in an artificially high estimate due to a double counting of the remaining deficit.
A comparison of the total deficits reported by the CBPP to those calculated in this study 
reveals an inconsistent pattern in the differences across time and across states. This 
study’s estimated deficits in the four states were smaller for FYs 2009 and 2010. How-
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ever, the comparison for FY 2011 shows that this study’s estimates were smaller in some 
states but larger in others.
Cyclical and structural deficits
The total deficit consists of two parts: a cyclical deficit (or surplus) and a structural deficit 
(or surplus) but estimating the size of the two components is rarely done. Some analysts 
ignore the cyclical deficit entirely, using “structural” deficit synonymously with “total” 
deficit. This is undesirable given the very different nature of the two components and 
potentially leads to misleading projections of future deficits. The estimate of cyclical and 
structural deficits must therefore take a broader perspective than focusing on the cur-
rent year’s budget. 
A cyclical deficit is largely the result of a decline in revenue during an economic reces-
sion. However, countercyclical increases in demand for certain governmental programs, 
such as food stamps, can also contribute, if states opt to boost spending on high-demand 
programs.51   As the economy recovers, the cyclical deficit will decline and then become a 
cyclical surplus.  A cyclical deficit will return during the next economic downturn.
This analysis calculates the cyclical deficit (or surplus) as the actual ongoing revenue per 
$1,000 of personal income in each of the recent years adjusted for all changes in the tax 
code, whether intended to be permanent or temporary.  Each year’s figure was com-
pared to the average annual adjusted revenue figure over the 2003-09 economic cycle.52 
A structural deficit is a permanent shortfall in revenue relative to expenditures, after 
cyclical fluctuations in revenues and expenditures are accounted for. A structural deficit 
typically is created during periods of strong economic growth, when decision-makers 
fail to recognize that a cyclical surge in revenue is temporary.  Permanently reducing 
tax rates without reducing expenditures and/or permanently increasing spending obliga-
tions without increasing revenues will cause a structural deficit. Barring any further ad-
justments to the revenue structure or to appropriations, the structural deficit will remain 
steady over time relative to the representative expenditure level.
In this study, the structural deficit was calculated simply as the difference between the 
total deficit and the cyclical deficit. 
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